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Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e. inputs that are impercepti-
bly perturbed from natural data and yet incorrectly classified by the network. Adversarial
training [34], a heuristic form of robust optimization that alternates between minimization
and maximization steps, has proven to be among the most successful methods to train net-
works that are robust against a pre-defined family of perturbations. This paper provides a
partial answer to the success of adversarial training. When the inner maximization prob-
lem can be solved to optimality, we prove that adversarial training finds a network of small
robust train loss. When the maximization problem is solved by a heuristic algorithm, we
prove that adversarial training finds a network of small robust surrogate train loss. The
analysis technique leverages recent work on the analysis of neural networks via Neural
Tangent Kernel (NTK), combined with online-learning when the maximization is solved
by a heuristic, and the expressiveness of the NTK kernel in the ℓ∞-norm.
1 Introduction
Recent studies have demonstrated that neural network models, despite achieving human-
level performance on many important tasks, are not robust to adversarial examples—a
∗Joint first author.
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small and human imperceptible input perturbation can easily change the prediction la-
bel [45, 24]. This phenomenon brings out security concerns when deploying neural net-
work models to real world systems [22]. In the past few years, many defense algorithms
have been developed [25, 44, 33, 30, 40] to improve the network’s robustness, but most of
them are still vulnerable under stronger attacks, as reported in [3]. Among current defense
methods, adversarial training [34] has become one of the most successful methods to train
robust neural networks.
To obtain a robust network, we need to consider the “robust loss” instead of a regular
loss. The robust loss is defined as the maximal loss within an ǫ-ball around each sample,
and minimizing the robust loss under empirical distribution leads to a min-max optimiza-
tion problem. Adversarial training [34] is a way to minimize the robust loss. At each
iteration, it (approximately) solves the inner maximization problem by an attack algorithm
A to get an adversarial sample, and then runs a (stochastic) gradient-descent update to min-
imize the loss on the adversarial sample. Although adversarial training has been widely
used in practice and hugely improves the robustness of neural networks in many applica-
tions, its convergence properties are still unknown. It is unclear whether a network with
small robust error exists and whether adversarial training is able to converge to a solution
with minimal train adversarial loss.
In this paper, we study the convergence of adversarial training algorithms and try to an-
swer the above questions on over-parameterized neural networks. We consider the setting
where the neural network has H layers with width m, smooth activation, and n training
samples. This assumption holds for many activation functions including the soft-plus and
sigmoid. Our contributions are summarized below.
• For a general attack/perturbation algorithm A, we show that gradient descent con-
verges to a network where the robust surrogate loss with respect to the attack A is
within ǫ of the optimal robust loss, when the widthm ≥ 2O(H)n
ǫ2
(Theorem 4.1).
• We then consider the expressivity of neural networks w.r.t. robust loss (or robust
interpolation). We show when the width m is sufficiently large, the neural network
can achieve optimal robust loss ǫ; see Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 for precise statement.
By combining these results, we show that adversarial training finds networks of
small robust training loss (Corollary 5.1 and Corollary 5.2).
• Conversely, the complexity of robust learning is higher. We show that the VC-
Dimension of the model class which can robustly interpolate any n samples is lower
bounded by Ω(nd) where d is the dimension. In contrast, there are neural net archi-
tectures that can interpolate n samples with only O(n) parameters. For this class
of architectures the VC-Dimension is upper bounded by O(n logn). Thus robust
learning provably requires larger complexity and capacity.
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2 Related Work
Attack and Defense Adversarial examples are inputs that are slightly perturbed from a
natural sample and yet incorrectly classified by the model. An adversarial example can
be generated by maximizing the loss function within an ǫ-ball around a natural sample.
Thus, generating adversarial examples can be viewed as solving a constrained optimiza-
tion problem and can be (approximately) solved by a projected gradient descent (PGD)
method [34]. Some other techniques have also been proposed in the literature including
l-BFGS [45], FGSM [24], iterative FGSM [28] and C&W attack [14], where they differ
from each other by the distance measurements, loss function or optimization algorithms.
There are also studies on adversarial attacks with limited information about the target
model. For instance, [15, 26, 10, 32] considered the black-box setting where the model is
hidden but the attacker can make queries and get the corresponding outputs of the model.
Improving the robustness of neural networks against adversarial attacks, also known as
defense, has been recognized as an important and unsolved problem in machine learning.
Various kinds of defense methods have been proposed [25, 44, 33, 30, 40], but many of
them are based on obfuscated gradients which does not really improve robustness under
stronger attacks [3]. As an exception, [3] reported that the adversarial training method
developed in [34] is the only defense that works even under carefully designed attacks.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training is one of the first defense ideas proposed in
earlier papers [24]. The main idea is to add adversarial examples into the training set
to improve the robustness. However, earlier work usually only adds adversarial example
once or only few times during the training phase. Recently, [34] showed that adversarial
training can be viewed as solving a min-max optimization problem where the training
algorithm aims to minimize the robust loss, defined as the maximal loss within a certain
ǫ-ball around each training sample. Based on this formulation, a clean adversarial training
procedure based on PGD-attack has been developed and achieved state-of-the-art results
even under strong attacks. This also motivates some recent research on gaining theoretical
understanding of robust error [11, 41]. Also, adversarial training suffers from slow training
time since it runs several steps of attacks within one update, and several recent works are
trying to resolve this issue [42, 53]. From the theoretical perspective, a recent work [46]
considers to quantitatively evaluate the convergence quality of adversarial examples found
in the inner maximization and therefore ensure robustness. [51] consider generalization
upper and lower bounds for robust generalization. [31] improves the robust generalization
by data augmentation with GAN. [23] considers to reduce the optimization of min-max
problem to online learning setting and use their results to analyze the convergence of
GAN. In this paper, our analysis for adversarial is quite general and is not restricted to any
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specific kind of attack algorithm.
Certified Defense and Robustness Verification For each sample, the robust loss is de-
fined as the max loss within an ǫ-ball. Due to the non-convexity, attack algorithms usually
fail to find the exact max, so robust error computed by an attack algorithm cannot give us
a formal guarantee of robustness. As a consequence, networks trained by standard adver-
sarial training algorithms [34], although being robust under strong attacks, do not have a
certified guarantee of robustness.
Neural network verification methods, in contrast to attack, are trying to find upper
bounds of robust error and provide certified robustness measurements. Several algorithms
have been proposed recently. [48] proposed to solve the dual of a linear relaxation problem
to obtain a certified bound. [47, 54] provides a similar algorithm based on primal relax-
ation. [43] proposed another approach based on abstract interpretation. More recently,
[39] provided a unified view, showing that most of the existing verification methods are
based on a convex relaxation of ReLU network.
Equipped with these verification methods for computing upper bounds of robust error,
one can then apply adversarial training to get a network with certified robustness. This is
first proposed in [48]. At each iteration, instead of finding a lower bound of robust error by
attack, we can find an upper bound of robust error by verification and and train the model to
minimize this upper bound. Several certified adversarial training algorithms along this line
have been proposed recently [49, 21]. Our analysis in Section 4 can incorporate certified
adversarial training.
Global convergence of Gradient Descent Recent work on the over-parametrization of
neural networks prove that when the width greatly exceeds the sample size, gradient de-
scent converges to a global minimizer from random initialization [29, 19, 20, 1, 55]. The
key idea in the earlier literature is to show that the Jacobian w.r.t. parameters has minimum
singular value lower bounded, and thus there is a global minimum near every random ini-
tialization, with high probability. However for the robust loss and robust surrogate loss, the
maximization cannot be evaluated and the Jacobian is not necessarily full rank. Similarly
with the robust surrogate loss, the heuristic attack algorithm may not even be continuous
and so the same arguments cannot be utilized.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
Let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use N (0, I) to denote the standard Gaussian distribution. For
a vector v, we use ‖v‖2 to denote the Euclidean norm. For a matrix A we use ‖A‖F
to denote the Frobenius norm and ‖A‖2 to denote the operator norm. We use 〈·, ·〉 to
denote the standard Euclidean inner product between two vectors or matrices. We let O(·)
and Ω (·) denote standard Big-O and Big-Omega notations that suppress multiplicative
constants.
3.2 Neural Network
In this paper we focus on the training of multilayer fully-connected neural networks. For-
mally, we consider a neural network of the following form.
Let x ∈ Rd be the input, the fully-connected neural network is defined as follows:
W(1) ∈ Rm×d is the first weight matrix, W(h) ∈ Rm×m is the weight at the h-th layer
for 2 ≤ h ≤ H , a ∈ Rm×1 is the output layer and σ(·) is the activation function.1 The
parameters are W = (vec{W(1)}⊤, · · · , vec{W(H)}⊤, a⊤)⊤. We define the prediction
function recursively (for simplicity we let x(0) = x):
x(h) =
√
cσ
m
σ
(
W(h)x(h−1)
)
, 1 ≤ h ≤ H,
f(W,x) = a⊤x(H), (1)
where cσ =
(
Ex∼N(0,1) [σ(x)2]
)−1
is a scaling factor to normalize the input at initialization.
We make a technical assumption on the activation function σ(·) which holds for many
activation functions, although not the ReLU.
Assumption 3.1 (Smoothness of activation function). The activation function is Lipschitz
and smooth, that is, we can assume there exists a constant C > 0 such that for any z ∈ R
|σ′(z)| ≤ C and σ′(z) is C-Lipschitz.
Assumption 3.2 (Smoothness of loss). The loss ℓ(f(x), y) is Lipschitz, smooth, convex in
f(x) and satisfies ℓ(y, y) = 0.
1We assume intermediate layers are square matrices of sizem for simplicity. It is not difficult to general-
ize our analysis to rectangular weight matrices.
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We use the following initialization scheme: each entry in allW(h) for h ∈ [H ] follows
from the i.i.d. standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), and a follows the i.i.d. uniform
distribution on {−1, 1}. Similar to [20], we consider the case when we only train on
W(h) for h ∈ [H ] and fix a. For training set {xi, yi}ni=1, the (non-robust) training loss is
L(W) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(f(W,xi), yi).
The key architectural parameter is the width m. As we shall see, the robust train loss
we obtain scales inversely with the widthm, and so for overparametrized networks we are
able to minimize the robust train loss.
3.3 Perturbation and the Surrogate Loss Function
The goal of adversarial training is to make the model robust in a neighbor of each datum.
We first introduce the definition of the perturbation set function to determine the perturba-
tion set at each points.
Definition 3.1 (Perturbation Set). The perturbation set function is B : Rd → P(Rd),
where, we use P(Rd) to stand for the power set of Rd. At each data point x, B(x)
gives the perturbation set that we would like to guarantee the robustness on. For ex-
ample, commonly used perturbation sets are B∞(x) = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖∞ < ǫ0} and
B2(x) = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖2 < ǫ0}. Given a dataset {xi, yi}ni=1, we say that the perturbation
set is compatible with the dataset if B(xi) ∩ B(xj) 6= φ implies yi = yj . In the rest of
the paper, we will always assume that B is compatible to the given data. Our framework
allows for arbitrary perturbation sets compatible with the empirical dataset.
Given a perturbation set, we are now ready to define the perturbation function that map
a data point to another point inside its perturbation set. We note that the perturbation func-
tion can be quite general including the identity function, the adversarial attack mapping
and some random sample mapping. Formally, we give the following definition.
Definition 3.2 (Perturbation Function). A perturbation function is defined as a function
A : W × Rd → Rd, where W is the parameter space. Given the parameter W of
the neural network (1), A(W,x) maps x ∈ Rd to x′ ∈ B(x) where B(x) refers to the
perturbation set defined in Definition 3.1.
With the definition of perturbation function, we can now define a large family of loss
functions on the training set {xi, yi}ni=1. We will show this definition covers the standard
loss used in empirical risk minimization and the robust loss used in adversarial training.
Definition 3.3 (Surrogate Loss Function). Given a perturbation function A defined in
Definition 3.2, the current parameterW of the neural network f defined in (1), a training
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set {xi, yi}ni=1, we define the surrogate loss function LA(W) on the training set as
LA(W) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(f(W,A(W,xi)), yi).
It can be easily observed that the standard training loss L(W) is a special case of sur-
rogate loss function with A as the identity. The goal of adversarial training is to minimize
the robust loss, i.e. LA(W) with A(W,x) = argmaxx∈B(x) ℓ(f(W,A(W,x)), y). We
denote the robust loss as L∗(W).
4 Convergence Results of Adversarial Training
We consider optimizing the surrogate loss LA with the perturbation function A(W,x)
defined in Definition 3.2. In this section, we will prove that after certain steps of projected
gradient descent with a convex setR(W0, B), the lossLA is provably upper-bounded with
the best minimax loss in this set.
min
W∈R(W0,B)
L∗(W),
where
R(W0, B) =
{
W :
∥∥w(h)r − w(h)r (0)∥∥2 ≤ B√m, h ∈ [H ], r ∈ [m]
}
, (2)
where w
(h)
r is the r-th row of W(h) and w
(h)
r (0) is the r-th row of W
(h)
0 , and B depends
polynomially on the smoothness parameters of Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2.
Denote the parameter W at the k-th iteration as Wk, and similarlyWk,(h) and w
k,(h)
r .
For each step in adversarial training, projected gradient descent takes an update
Vk+1 = Wk − α∇WLA(Wk),
Wk+1 = PR(Vk+1),
where
∇WLA(Wk) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
l′ (f(W,A(W,xi)), yi)∇Wf(W,A(W,xi)),
the gradient∇Wf is with respect to the first argumentW, and PR is the Euclidean projec-
tion to a convex setR. We will takeR as the convex setR(W0, B) defined in Equation (2).
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We show that for sufficiently wide neural networks, within the set R(W0, B) in the
parameter space, gradient descent can find a point with surrogate loss no more than the
minimum robust loss in R(W0, B). In Section 5, we show that the set R(W0, B) is
sufficiently large to find a classifier of low robust loss. We assume the perturbation set of
the input B(x) is in a Euclidean ball with radius e and e ≤ 1. Specifically, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Convergence of Projected Gradient Descent for Optimizing Surrogate Loss).
Suppose the input x is bounded, the activation function σ(·) satisfies Assumption 3.1, and
the loss function satisfies Assumption 3.2. If we run projected gradient descent based on
the convex constraint setR(W0, B) with stepsize α = 2−Ω(H), then with probability 0.99,
for any ǫ > 0, ifm = Ω
(
B4n2O(H)
ǫ2
)
, we have
min
k=1,··· ,T
LA(Wk)− L∗(W∗) ≤ ǫ, (3)
where W∗ = minW∈R(W0,B) L∗(W) and T = Ω(
B2
ǫα
).
Remark. Recall that the surrogate loss LA(W) is the loss suffered when with respect
to the perturbation function A. For example if the adversary uses the projected gradi-
ent ascent algorithm, then the theorem guarantees that projected gradient ascent cannot
successfully attack the learned network.
Remark. For two-layer networksH = 1, the update onW does not require the projection
step as it is implicitly enforced by gradient descent.
4.1 Proof Sketch
Our proof idea utilizes the same high-level intuition as [29, 19, 55, 12, 13] that near the
initialization the network is linear. However, unlike these earlier works, the surrogate loss
neither smooth, nor semi-smooth so there is no Polyak gradient domination phenomenon
to allow for the global geometric contraction of gradient descent. In fact due to the the
generality of perturbation functionA allowed, the robust surrogate loss is not differentiable
nor even continuous in W, and so the standard analysis cannot be applied. Our analysis
utilizes two key observations. First the network f(W,A(W,x)) is still smooth w.r.t. the
first argument2, and is close to linear in the first argument near initialization, which is
shown by directly bounding the Hessian w.r.t. W. Second, the perturbation functionA can
be treated as an adversary providing a worst-case loss function ℓA(f, y) as done in online
2It is not jointly smooth inW , which is part of the subletly of the analysis.
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learning. However, online learning typically assumes the sequence of losses is convex,
which is not the case here. We make a careful decoupling of the contribution to non-
convexity from the first argument and the worst-case contribution from the perturbation
function, we can prove gradient descent succeeds in minimizing the surrogate loss.
5 Adversarial Training Finds Robust Classifier
Motivated by the optimization result in Theorem 4.1, we hope to show that there is indeed
a robust classifier in R(W0, B). To show this, we utilize the connection between neural
networks and their induced Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) via viewing neural
networks trained near initialization as a random feature scheme [16, 17, 27, 2]. Since we
only need to show the existence of a network architecture that robustly fits the training
data in R(W0, B) and neural networks are at least as expressive as their induced kernels,
we may prove this via the RKHS connection. The strategy is to first show the existence
of a robust classifier in the RKHS, and then show that a sufficiently wide network can
approximate the kernel via random feature analysis. The results of this section will have,
in general, exponential in dimension dependence due to the known issue of d-dimensional
functions having exponentially large RKHS norm [4], so only offer qualitative guidance
on existence of robust classifiers.
Since deep networks contain two-layer networks as a sub-network, and this section is
only concerned with expressivity, we focus on the local expressivity of two-layer networks.
We write the standard two-layer network in the suggestive way
f(W,x) =
1√
2m
(
m∑
r=1
arσ(w
⊤
r x) +
m∑
r=1
a′rσ(w¯
⊤
r x)
)
,
and initialize as wr ∼ N (0, 1d) and w¯r is set to be equal to wr, ar is randomly drawn
from {1,−1} and a′r = −ar. We denote wr0, ar0, w¯r0, a′r0 the initialization parameters
respectively. In this section, we will consider the data and perturbation set defined on the
surface S of the unit ball, i.e. we assume x ∈ S and B(x) ⊂ S.
For convenience, we firstly introduce the Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK) [27] w.r.t. our
neural network formulation in Equation (1).
Definition 5.1 (NTK [27]). The NTK with activation function σ (·) and initialization dis-
tributionw ∼ N (0, 1
d
Id) is defined as Kσ(x,y) = Ew∼N (0, 1
d
Id)
〈xσ′(w⊤x),yσ′(w⊤y)〉.
For a given kernel K, there is a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) introduced
byK. We denote it asH(K). We refer the readers to [37] for an introduction of the theory
of RKHS.
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In Section 5.1, we will first give a general existence result of classifier with robust loss
no more than ǫ for two-layer networks with activation functions that induce universal ker-
nels. Secondly, specifically for a two-layer quadratic-ReLU activation neural network, we
show that adversarial training can find a robust classifier, and provide the explicit depen-
dence of the widthm w.r.t. ǫ.
5.1 Existence of Robust Classifier near Initialization
We formally make the following assumption, which is later verified when the activation
induces an universal kernel.
Assumption 5.1 (Existence of Robust Classifier in NTK). For any ǫ > 0, there exists
f ∈ H(Kσ), such that |f(x)− yi| ≤ ǫ, for every x ∈ B(xi), where B(xi) ⊂ S is the
perturbation set defined in Definition 3.1.
Assumption 5.1 can be verified for a large class of activation functions by showing their
induced kernel is universal as done in [35]. In addition, we will show that this assumption
is mild in our example of quadratic-ReLU network.
Under this assumption, by applying the strategy of approximating the infinite situation
by finite sum of random features, we can get the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 (Robust Classifier near Initialization). Given dataset D equipped with a
compatible perturbation set function B (See Definition 3.1). Under Assumption 5.1, given
ǫ > 0, there existsBD,B,ǫ such that when the widthm satisfiesm >
B2
D,B,ǫ
ǫ
, with probability
at least 0.99 there existsW such that
L∗(W) ≤ ǫ andW ∈ R(W0, BD,B,ǫ).
This theorem shows that we can indeed find a classifier of low robust loss within a
neighborhood of the initialization. Combining Theorem 4.1 and 5.1 we know that
Corollary 5.1 (Adversarial Training Finds a Network of Small Robust Train Loss). Given
data set on the unit sphere equipped with a compatible perturbation set function and an
associated perturbation function A, which also takes value on the unit sphere. Suppose
Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 5.1 are satisfied. Then there exists a BD,B,ǫ which only depends on
dataset D, perturbation B and ǫ, corresponding to the RKHS radius, such that for any
2-layer fully connected network with width m = Ω(
B4
D,B,ǫ
ǫ2
), if we run projected gradient
descent with stepsize α on R(W0, BD,B,ǫ) for T = Ω(B
2
D,B,ǫ
ǫα
) steps, then with probability
0.99,
min
k=1,··· ,T
LA(Wk) ≤ ǫ. (4)
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Therefore, adversarial training is guaranteed to find a robust classifier under a given
attack algorithm when the network width is sufficiently large.
5.2 Example: Two-layer Quadratic-ReLU Network
We consider the arc-cosine neural tangent kernel (NTK) introduced by two-layer network
with quadratic ReLU activation function as a guide example. In this section, we quanti-
tatively derive the dependency of ǫ for BD,B,ǫ and m in Theorem 5.1 for this two-layer
network and verify that the induced kernel is universal. The network has the expression
f(W,x) =
1√
M
M∑
r=1
arσ(w
⊤
r x) (5)
where the activation σ(x) = ReLU (x)2 (ReLU (x) = max{0, x}), and a is initialized
uniformly from {±1}, andW is initialized i.i.d. fromN (0, 1) and onlyW is trained. The
NTK has the following explicit expression:
Kσ(x,y) = Ew∼N (0, 1
d
Id)
〈xReLU (w⊤x) ,yReLU (w⊤y)〉, (6)
We denote ‖·‖H the RKHS norm of H(Kσ). The following lemma gives a sufficient con-
dition for the function to be inH(Kσ).
Lemma 5.1 (RKHS contains smooth functions, Proposition 2 in [4], Corollary 6 in [8]).
Let f : S → R be an even function such that all i-th order derivatives exist and are
bounded by η for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, with s ≥ (d + 3)/2. Then f ∈ H(Kσ) with ‖f‖H ≤ Cdη
where Cd is a constant that only depend on the dimension d.
We then make a mild assumption of the dataset3
Assumption 5.2 (Non-overlapping). The dataset {xi, yi}ni=1 ⊂ S and the perturbation set
function B satisfies:
• B(xi) is compact set on S for all i,
• There does not exist x, x¯ and i, j such that x ∈ B(xi) ∪ (−B(xi)), x¯ ∈ B(xj) ∪
(−B(xj)) but yi 6= yj .
3Our assumption on the dataset essentially requires xi 6= ±xj since the ReLU NTK kernel only contains
even functions. However, this can be enforced via a lifting trick: let x˜ = [x, 1] ∈ Rd+1 , then the data x˜ lie
on the positive hemisphere. On the lifted space, even functions can separate any datapoints.
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Under this assumption, one can easily construct a smooth classifier g on S such that
g(x) = yi for all x ∈ B(xi). By Lemma 5.1, we have g ∈ H(Kσ) with RKHS norm
‖g‖H ≤ CD where CD is a constant only depends on dataset D and perturbation function.
We then approximate g using random feature techniques. The following theorem provides
the desired result:
Theorem 5.2 (Approximation by finite sum). For a given Lipschitz function h ∈ H(Kσ).
For ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), let w1, · · · ,wM be sampled i.i.d. fromN (0, 1dId) where
M = Ω
(
CD,B
1
ǫd+1
log
1
ǫd+1δ
)
. (7)
andCD,B is a constant that only depends on the datasetD and the compatible perturbation
B. Then with probability at least 1 − δ, there exists c1, · · · , cM where ci ∈ Rd such that
hˆ =
∑M
r=1 c
⊤
r xReLU
(
w⊤r x
)
satisfies
M∑
r=1
‖cr‖22 = O
(
1
M
)
, (8)∥∥∥h− hˆ∥∥∥
∞,S
≤ ǫ. (9)
We then specializes Theorem 4.1 for our two-layer quadratic-ReLU network. We make
a modification to the setR(W0, B) defined in Equation (2) in order to match the previous
approximation results, which is
Rˆ(W0, B) = {W : ‖W −W(0)‖F ≤ B} . (10)
Due to this modification and that for two-layer the projection step to the set Rˆ is
unnecessary, we provide a full proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.3 (Convergence of Gradient Descent for Optimizing Surrogate Loss For Two-layer
Networks). Suppose the input x is bounded, and the loss function satisfies Assumption 3.2.
For the two-layer network defined in Equation (5), if we run projected gradient descent
based on the convex constraint set Rˆ(W0, B) with a small stepsize α, then for any ǫ > 0,
ifm = Ω
(
B4n
ǫ2
)
, we have
min
k=1,··· ,T
LA(Wk)− L∗(W∗) ≤ ǫ, (11)
where W∗ = min
W∈Rˆ(W0,B) L∗(W) and T = Ω(
B2
ǫα
).
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Then, we can get an overall theorem for the quadratic-ReLU network which is similar
to Corollary 5.1 but with explicit ǫ dependence:
Corollary 5.2 (Adversarial Training Finds a Network of Small Robust Train Loss for
Quadratic-ReLU Network). Given data set on the unit sphere equipped with a compatible
perturbation set function and an associated perturbation function A, which also takes
value on the unit sphere. Suppose Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 5.2 are satisfied. Then for any B
and any 2-layer quadratic-ReLU network with width m = Ω(
B4C′
D,B
ǫd+1
log 1
ǫ
) (where C ′D,B
is a constant that only depends on the dataset D and perturbation B), if we run projected
gradient descent with stepsize α onR(W0, B) for T = Ω(B2ǫα ) steps, then with probability
0.99,
min
k=1,··· ,T
LA(Wk) ≤ ǫ. (12)
6 Capacity Requirement of Robustness
In this section, we will show that in order to achieve adversarially robust interpolation
(which is formally defined below), one needs more capacity than just normal interpolation.
In fact, empirical evidence have already shown that to reliably withstand strong adversar-
ial attacks, networks require a significantly larger capacity than for correctly classifying
benign examples only [34]. This implies, in some sense, that using a neural network with
larger width is necessary.
Let Sδ = {(x1, · · · ,xn) ∈ X n : ‖xi − xj‖2 > 2δ} and Bδ(x) = {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ δ},
where δ is a constant, we will consider each n data in Sδ and use Bδ as the perturbation set
function in this section.
We begin with the definition of the interpolation class and the robust interpolation
class.
Definition 6.1 (Interpolation class). We say that a function class F of functions f : Rd →
{1,−1}4is an n-interpolation class, if the following is satisfied:
∀(x1, · · · ,xn) ∈ Sδ, ∀(y1, · · · , yn) ∈ {±1}n,
∃f ∈ F , s.t. f(xi) = yi, ∀i ∈ [n].
4Here we let the classification output be ±1, and a usual classifier f outputing a number in R is treated
as sign(f) here.
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Definition 6.2 (Robust interpolation class). We say that a function class F is an n-robust
interpolation class, if the following is satisfied:
∀(x1, · · · ,xn) ∈ Sδ, ∀(y1, · · · , yn) ∈ {±1}n,
∃f ∈ F , s.t.f(x′i) = yi, ∀x′i ∈ Bδ(xi), ∀i ∈ [n].
We will use the VC-Dimension of a function class F to measure its complexity. In
fact, as shown in [6] (Equation(2)), for neural networks there is a tight connection be-
tween the number of parameters W , the number of layers H and their VC-Dimension
Ω(HW log(W/L)) ≤ VC-Dimension ≤ O(HW logW ). In addition, combining with the
results in [52] (Theorem 3) which shows the existence of a 4-layer neural network with
O(n) parameters that can interpolate any n data points, i.e. an interpolation class, we
have that an n-interpolation class can be realized by a fixed depth neural network with
VC-Dimension upper bound
VC-Dimension ≤ O(n logn). (13)
For a general hypothesis class F , we can evidently see that when F is an n-interpolation
class,F has VC-Dimension at least n. For a neural network that is an n-interpolation class,
without further architectural constraints, this lower bound of its VC-dimension is tight up
to logarithmic factors as indicated in 13. However, we show that for a robust-interpolation
class we will have a much larger VC-Dimension lower bound:
Theorem 6.1. If F is an n-robust interpolation class. Then we have lower bound on the
VC-Dimension of F
VC-Dimension ≥ Ω(nd), (14)
where d is the dimension of the input space.
For neural networks, Equation (14) shows that any architecture that is an n-robust
interpolation class should have VC-Dimension at least Ω(nd). Comparing with Equa-
tion (13) which shows n-interpolation class can be realized by a network architecture with
VC-Dimension O(n logn), we can conclude that robust interpolation by neural networks
needs more capacity, so increasing the width of neural network is indeed necessary.
7 Discussion
This work provides a theoretical analysis of the empirically successful adversarial training
algorithm in the training of robust neural networks. Our main results indicate that adversar-
ial training will find a network of low robust surrogate loss, even when the maximization
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is computed via a heuristic algorithm such as projected gradient ascent. We feel these
results lead to several thought-provoking future steps. Can we ensure the robust surrogate
loss is low with respect to a larger family of perturbation functions than that used during
training? It is natural to ask whether the depth dependence can be improved to poly(H)
using the tools of [1], and whether the projection step can be removed as it is empirically
unnecessary and also unnecessary for our analysis for H = 1. On the expressiveness side,
the current argument utilizes that a neural net restricted to a local region can approximate
its induced RKHS. Although the RKHS is universal, they do not avoid the curse of dimen-
sion, so it is natural to ask whether the robust expressivity of neural networks can adapt to
structure such as low latent dimension of the data mechanism [18, 50]. Since this question
is largely unanswered even for neural nets in the non-robust setting, we leave it to future
work.
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A Proof of ConvergenceResults for DeepNets in Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Denote dk = ‖Wk−W∗‖F . We will perform T steps of projected
gradient descent with step size α and then stop.
For projected gradient descent, Wk ∈ R(W0, B) holds for all k = 1, · · · , T . Recall
the update rule of projected gradient descent isWk+1 = PR(W0,B) (Wk − α∇WLA(Wk)).
We have
d2k+1 = ‖Wk+1 −W∗‖2F
≤ ‖Vk+1 −W∗‖2F
= ‖Wk −W∗‖2F + 2(Vk+1 −Wk) · (Wk −W∗) + ‖Vk+1 −Wk‖2F
= d2k + 2α∇WL(Wk,A(Wk,x)) · (W∗ −Wk) + α2‖∇WL(Wk,A(Wk,x))‖2F ,
(15)
where in the first inequality we use that fact that when we project a point ontoR(W0, B),
we move closer to every point inR(W0, B), and in particular, any optimal point. Now we
need to analyze the gradient ∇WL(Wk,A(Wk,x)). To simplify notations, we define
f ′(W,x) =
∂f(W,x)
∂W
, f ′(h)(W,x) =
∂f(W,x)
∂W(h)
,
L′A(W) = ∇WL(Wk,A(Wk,x)), L′(h)A (W) = ∇W(h)L(Wk,A(Wk,x)).
where ∇W(h)L is the derivative toW(h) in the first argument of L.
Note that
L
′(h)
A (W
k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
l′(f(Wk, x̂ki ), yi)f
′(h)(Wk, x̂ki ),
where x̂ki = A(Wk,xi). Since the loss function l is Lipschitz, we know |l′| ≤ 1, we have∥∥∥L′(h)A (Wk)∥∥∥
F
≤ max
i∈[n]
∥∥∥f ′(h)(Wk, x̂ki )∥∥∥
F
≤ max
i∈[n]
∥∥∥∥∥(cσm)H−h+12 x̂k,(h−1)i
(
a⊤
(
H∏
l=h+1
J
k,(l)
i W
k,(l)
)
J
k,(h)
i
)∥∥∥∥∥
F
,
where J
(l)
i is a diagonal matrix whose i-th diagonal entry is σ
′(w(h)r · x̂(h−1)i ).
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To bound the RHS, note that he definition ofR(W0, B) implies that
∥∥∥Wk,(h) −W(h)0 ∥∥∥
F
≤
B. According to Lemma B.1, B.3 and G.2 in [19], with probability 0.99, we have for all
i ∈ [n], h ∈ [H ], ‖W0,(h)‖2 = O(1),
∥∥∥x0,(h)i ∥∥∥
2
= O(1) and
∥∥∥xk,(h)i − x0,(h)i ∥∥∥
2
≤ 2O(H)B√
m
.
Therefore, under our choice ofm, we have∥∥∥xk,(h)i ∥∥∥
2
= O(1),∥∥Wk,(h)∥∥
2√
m
= O(1).
Also note that by the Lipschitz-ness of our neural network, it is easy to show
∥∥∥x̂k,(h)i − xk,(h)i ∥∥∥
2
≤
e · 2O(H), which implies ∥∥∥x̂k,(h)i ∥∥∥
2
= O(1) + e · 2O(H) = 2O(H).
Recall
∥∥∥Jk,(h)i ∥∥∥
2
= O(1) due to the Lipschitzness of our activation function, we have∥∥∥L′(h)A (Wk)∥∥∥
F
= 2O(H).
Thus
‖∇WLA‖2F ≤
H∑
h=1
∥∥∥L′(h)A (Wk)∥∥∥2
F
= 2O(H).
which gives the bound of the third term of Equation 15. Now we are going to bound the
second term of Equation 15. Note that letting∆W = W∗ −Wk, we have
LA(W∗)− LA(Wk) =
∫ 1
t=0
〈
∆W,∇WLA(Wk + t∆W)
〉
dt
=
〈
∆W,∇WLA(Wk)
〉
+∫ 1
t=0
〈
∆W,∇WLA(Wk + t∆W)−∇WLA(Wk)
〉
dt
≥ 〈∆W,∇WLA(Wk)〉
−
H∑
h=1
∥∥∆W(h)∥∥
F
max
0≤t≤1
∥∥∇WLA(Wk,(h) + t∆W(h))−∇WLA(Wk,(h))∥∥F ,
22
We useWs to denoteWk + s∆W, then∥∥f ′(h)(Wk, x̂ki )− f ′(h)(Ws, x̂ki )∥∥F
=
(cσ
m
)H−h+1
2
∥∥∥∥∥x̂k,(h−1)i
(
a⊤
(
H∏
l=h+1
J
k,(l)
i W
k,(l)
)
J
k,(h)
i
)
−x̂s,(h−1)i
(
a⊤
(
H∏
l=h+1
J
s,(l)
i W
s,(l)
)
J
s,(h)
i
)∥∥∥∥∥
F
.
Note that bothWk,Ws ∈ R(W0, B), again using Lemma B.3 in [19], we have∥∥Wk,(l) −Ws,(l)∥∥
F
≤2B,∥∥∥x̂k,(h−1)i − x̂s,(h−1)i ∥∥∥
2
≤O(2
O(H)B√
m
).
Recall
∥∥∥wk,(h)r − ws,(h)r ∥∥∥
2
≤ 2B√
m
, it is easy to show
|σ′(wk,(h)r · xk,(h−1)i )− σ′(ws,(h)r · xs,(h−1)i )| = O(
2O(H)B√
m
),
by the definition of J
(l)
i , we know,∥∥∥Jk,(l)i − Js,(l)i ∥∥∥
2
≤O(2
O(H)B√
m
).
Thus, according to Lemma G.1 in [19], we have∥∥f ′(h)(Wk, x̂ki )− f ′(h)(Ws, x̂ki )∥∥F ≤ O(2O(H)B√m ),
which implies
〈
∆W,∇WLA(Wk)
〉 ≤ LA(W∗)− LA(Wk) +O(2O(H)B2√
m
).
Thus, let Dk = mini∈[k](LA(Wi)− L∗(W∗)), we have
d2k+1 = d
2
k − 2αDk + α ·O(
2O(H)B2√
m
) + α2O(2O(H)).
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Recall that dk+1 < 2B, we have
DT = O(
B2
αT
+
2O(H)B2√
m
+
α2O(H)
T
+ α2O(H)).
Choosing T = Ω(B
2
ǫα
) and α = 2−Ω(H), under the choice ofm, we complete the proof.
B Proof of Gradient Descent Finding Robust Classifier in
Section 5
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
As discussed in Section 5.1, we will use the idea of random feature [38] to approximate
g ∈ H(Kσ) on the unit sphere. We consider functions of the form
h(x) =
∫
Rd
c(w)⊤xσ′(w⊤x)dw,
where c(w) : Rd → Rd is any function from Rd to Rd. We define the RF-norm of h as
‖h‖RF = supw ‖c(w)‖2p0(w) where p0(w) is the probability density function ofN (0, 1dId), which
is the distribution of initialization. Define the function class with finite N (0, 1
d
Id)-norm
as FRF =
{
h(x) =
∫
Rd
c(w)⊤xσ′(w⊤x)dw : ‖h‖RF <∞
}
. We firstly show that FRF is
dense inH(Kσ).
Lemma B.1 (Universality of FRF). Let FRF andH(Kσ) be defined as above. Then FRF is
dense inH(Kσ) w.r.t. ‖·‖∞,S , where ‖f‖∞,S = supx∈S |f(x)|.
Proof. Observe that by the definition of the RKHS introduced byKσ, functions with form
h(x) =
∑
t atK(x,xt), xt ∈ S are dense in H(Kσ). But these functions can also be
written in the form h(x) =
∫
Rd
c(w)⊤xσ′(w⊤x)dwwhere c(w) = p0(w)
∑
t atxtσ
′(w⊤xt).
Notice that ‖c(w)‖2 ≤ p(w)
∑
t
∥∥atxtσ′(w⊤xt)∥∥2 <∞ since S is a compact set and σ′ is
continuous, this verifies that h is an element in FRF. So FRF contains a dense set ofH(Kσ)
and therefore dense inH(Kσ). Then notice that the evaluation operator Kσ,x is uniformly
bounded for x ∈ S, so ‖·‖∞,S can be controlled by the RKHS norm and therefore complete
the proof.
We then show that we can approximate elements of FRF by finite random features. Our
results are inspired by [38]. For the next theorem, recall Assumption 3.1, the constant C
satisfies σ′ is C-Lipschitz, |σ′(·)| ≤ C.
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Proposition B.1 (Approximation by finite sum). Let h(x) =
∫
Rd
c(w)⊤xσ′(w⊤x)dw ∈
FRF. σ (0) = 0. Then for any δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ over w1, · · · ,wM
drawn i.i.d. from N (0, 1
d
Id), there exists c1, · · · , cM where ci ∈ Rd and ‖ci‖2 ≤ ‖h‖RFM , so
that the function hˆ =
∑M
i=1 c
⊤
i xσ
′(w⊤i x), satisfies∥∥∥hˆ− h∥∥∥
∞,S
≤ ‖h‖RF√
M
(
4C + C log
1
δ
)
.
Proof. Firstly, we construct hˆ with ci =
c(wi)
Mp0(wi)
. We first notice that ‖ci‖2 = ‖c(wi)‖2Mp0(wi) ≤
‖h‖RF
M
which satisfies the condition of the theorem. We then define the random variable
v(w1, · · · ,wM) =
∥∥∥hˆ− h∥∥∥
∞,S
.
We bound this deviation from its expectation using McDiarmid’s inequality.
To do so, we should first show that v is robust to the perturbation of one of its argu-
ments. In fact, for w1, · · · ,wM and w˜i we have
|v(w1, · · · ,wM)− v(w1, · · · , w˜i, · · · ,wM |)
=
1
M
∥∥∥∥c(wi)⊤xσ′(w⊤i x)p0(wi) − c(w˜i)
⊤xσ′(w˜i⊤x)
p0(w˜i)
∥∥∥∥
∞,S
≤ 1
M
‖h‖RF
(∥∥σ′(w⊤i x)∥∥∞,S + ∥∥σ′(w˜i⊤x)∥∥∞,S)
≤2C ‖h‖RF
M
,
by using triangle, Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and noticing that |σ′(·)| is bounded and
‖x‖2 = 1. We call the final quantity ξ.
Next, we bound the expectation of v. First, observe that the choice of w1, · · · ,wM
ensures that Ewhˆ = h. By symmetrization [36], we have
Ev =E sup
x∈S
∣∣∣hˆ(x)− Ehˆ(x)∣∣∣
≤2Ew,ǫ sup
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
ǫic
⊤
i xσ
′(w⊤i x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where ǫ1, · · · , ǫM is a sequence of Rademacher random variables.
Since
∣∣c⊤i x∣∣ ≤ ‖ci‖2 ≤ ‖h‖RFM and σ′ is C-Lipschitz, we have that c⊤i xσ′(·) is C‖h‖RFM -
Lipschitz in the scalar argument and zero when the scalar argument is zero. By Rademacher
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complexity inequality for Lipschitz function (Thm 12 part (4) in [7]) together with Cauchy-
Schwartz, Jensen’s inequality, we have
Ev ≤2Ew,ǫ sup
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
ǫic
⊤
i xσ
′(w⊤i x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤4C ‖h‖RF
M
E sup
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
ǫiw
⊤
i x
∣∣∣∣∣
≤4C ‖h‖RF
M
E
∥∥∥∥∥
M∑
i=1
ǫiwi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤4C ‖h‖RF√
M
√
E
w∼N (0, 1
d
Id)
‖w‖22,
call this quantity µ. Then McDiarmid’s inequailty implies
P[v ≥ µ+ ǫ] ≤ P[v ≥ Ev + ǫ] ≤ exp(− 2ǫ
2
Mξ
).
The theorem is proved by solving the ǫ while setting the right hand to the given δ.
Finally, we constructW∗ within a ball of the initializationW0 that suffers little robust
loss L∗(W∗). Using the symmetric initialization, we have f(W0,x) = 0 for all x. We
then use the neural Taylor expansion w.r.t. the parameters:
f(W,W0) ≈ 1√
2m
(
m∑
i=1
ai(wi −wi0)⊤xσ′(w⊤i0x) +
m∑
i=1
a′i(w¯i − w¯i0)⊤xσ′(w¯⊤i0x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
,
where we omitted the second order term. The term (i) has the form of the random feature
approximation, and so Proposition B.1 can be used to construct a robust interpolant.
In summarize, we have give the entire proof of Theorem 5.1 as follow.
Proof. Let L be the Lipschitz coefficient of the loss function ℓ. ǫ¯ = 2
3L
.
By Assumption 5.1 with ǫ¯, there exists g1 ∈ H(Kσ) such that
|f(x)− yi| ≤ ǫ,
for every x ∈ B(xi) where B(xi) is the perturbation set.
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By Lemma B.1, for ǫ¯ there is g2 ∈ FRF such that ‖g1 − g2‖∞,S ≤ ǫ¯. Then, by Theo-
rem B.1, we have c1, · · · , cm where ci ∈ Rd and
‖ci‖2 ≤
‖g2‖RF
m
,
such that g3 =
∑m
i=1 c
⊤
i xσ
′(w⊤i x) satisfies
‖g2 − g3‖∞,S ≤
‖g2‖RF√
m
(
4C + C log
1
δ
)
,
with probability at least 1− δ on the initializationwi’s.
We use the neural Taylor expansion w.r.t. the parameters:
f(W,x) = (W −W0)⊤∇Wf(W0,x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+ (W −W0)⊤∇2Wf(W1,x)(W −W0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
(16)
=
1√
2m
(
m∑
i=1
ai(wi −wi0)⊤xσ′(w⊤i0x) +
m∑
i=1
a′i(w¯i − w¯i0)⊤xσ′(w¯⊤i0x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
1√
2m
(
m∑
i=1
aiσ
′′(w⊤i1x)
(
(wi −wi0)⊤x
)2
+
m∑
i=1
a′iσ
′′(w¯⊤i1x)
(
(w¯i − w¯i0)⊤x
)2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
,
(17)
for someW1.
Then set wi = wi0 +
√
m
2
ci, w¯i =
√
m
2
ci − w¯i0 in Equation 16, we have
‖wr −wr0‖2 ≤
‖g2‖RF√
2m
,
1√
2m
(
m∑
i=1
ai(wi −wi0)⊤xσ′(w⊤i0x) +
m∑
i=1
a′i(w¯i − w¯i0)⊤xσ′(w¯⊤i0x)
)
=
1√
2m
(
m∑
i=1
ai
√
m
2
c⊤i xσ
′(w⊤i0x)−
m∑
i=1
a′i
√
m
2
c⊤i xσ
′(w¯⊤i0x)
)
=
m∑
i=1
c⊤i xσ
′(w⊤i x)
=g3,
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So
‖f(W, x)− g3‖∞,S =
∥∥∥ 1√
2m
( m∑
i=1
aiσ
′′(w⊤i1x)
(
(wi −wi0)⊤x
)2
+
m∑
i=1
a′iσ
′′(w¯⊤i1x)
(
(w¯i − w¯i0)⊤x
)2 )∥∥∥
∞,S
≤ C√
2m
‖g2‖2RF ,
and therefore
‖f(W, x)− g2‖∞,S ≤
C√
2m
‖g2‖2RF +
‖g2‖RF√
m
(
4C + C log
1
δ
)
. (18)
Finally, setm to be larger than
C‖g2‖RF
ǫ
(
‖g2‖RF√
2
+ 4 + log 1
δ
)
which makes the left hand
in Equation (18) no more than ǫ¯ and let BD,B,ǫ to be
√
2 ‖g2‖RF. Then
L∗(W) =
1
2n
n∑
i=1
sup
x∈B(xi)
ℓ (f(W,x), yi)
≤1
2
sup
i∈[n],x∈B(xi)
ℓ (f(W,x), yi)
≤L
2
sup
i∈[n],x∈B(xi)
(|f(W,x)− g3(x)|+ |g3(x)− g2(x)|+ |g2(x)− g1(x)|+ |g1(x)− yi|)
≤3L
2
ǫ¯
=ǫ.
The theorem follows by set δ = 0.01.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We use the ℓ2 approximation result in [5] and translate it to an ℓ∞ approximation result by
using Lipshitz continuity. We first state Proposition 1 in [5].
Lemma B.2 (Approximation of unit ball of H(Kσ), Corollary of Proposition 1 in [5]).
Let h ∈ H(Kσ). For ǫ > 0, let dρ be the uniform distribution on S. Let w1, · · · ,wM be
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sampled i.i.d. fromN (0, 1
d
Id) then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), if
M = Ω
(
‖h‖2H
ǫ
log
‖h‖2H
ǫδ
)
with probability at least 1−δ, there exists c1, · · · , cM ∈ Rd such that hˆ =
∑M
r=1 c
⊤
r xReLU
(
w⊤r x
)
satisfies
M∑
r=1
‖cr‖22 ≤
4 ‖h‖2H
M
, (19)∥∥∥h− hˆ∥∥∥2
L2(dρ)
=
∫
S
(
h− hˆ
)2
dρ ≤ ǫ. (20)
Then we can give the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Proof. We first show that hˆ is 2 ‖h‖H-Lipschitz with high probability. We will use a well-
known concentration inequality of the norm of Gaussian vector which state as follow:
Fact B.1. Let z ∈ Rmd be drawn from a centered spherical Gaussian, i.e. z ∼ N (0, σ2I)
where σ > 0. Then we have P[‖z‖2 ≥ σ
√
md+ t] ≤ e−t2/(2σ2).
Proof. We refer the reader to Example 5.7 in [9] for a reference of this standard result.
Combined with E[‖z‖2] ≤ σ
√
md, which is obtained from Jensen’s Inequality, the afore-
mentioned example gives the desired upper tail bound.
Let Lip(f) denote the Lipschitz coefficient of f . Then by the property of Lipschitz
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coefficient, we have
Lip(hˆ) =Lip
(
M∑
r=1
c⊤r xReLU
(
w⊤r x
))
≤
M∑
r=1
Lip
(
c⊤r xReLU
(
w⊤r x
))
≤
M∑
r=1
‖cr‖2 ‖x‖2 Lip
(
ReLU
(
w⊤r x
))
≤
M∑
r=1
‖cr‖2 ‖wr‖2
≤
√√√√( M∑
r=1
‖cr‖22
)(
M∑
r=1
‖wr‖22
)
≤
√√√√4 ‖h‖2H
M
(
M∑
r=1
‖wr‖22
)
≤2 ‖h‖H
1 +O
√ log 1δ
M
 , (With probability 1− δ/2 by Fact B.1)
which means hˆ has finite Lipschitz coefficient and therefore so does h− hˆ, and the upper
bound of Lipschitz constant cL only depends on the data and the perturbation. Then we
can bound the ℓ∞ approximation error. Suppose for some x ∈ S,
∣∣∣h(x)− hˆ(x)∣∣∣ > ǫ, since
h− hˆ is Lipschitz, it is not hard to see that, when ǫ is small,∫
S
(
h− hˆ
)2
&
π
d
2 ǫd+1
Γ(d/2 + 1)cdL
≍ ǫ
d+1
cdL
(2πe)
d
2
d
d+1
2
. (21)
By Lemma B.2, for some constant CD,B, when M = Ω
(
CD,B
ǫd+1
log 1
ǫd+1δ
)
, Equation (21)
fails, so
∥∥∥h− hˆ∥∥∥
∞,S
≤ ǫ holds and at the same time we have∑Mr=1 ‖cr‖22 = O ( 1M ).
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C A convergence Theorem for Two-Layer Networks Us-
ing Gradient Descent without Projection
Theorem C.1 (Convergence of Gradient Descent without Projection for Optimizing Surro-
gate Loss For Two-layer Networks). Suppose the input x is bounded, and the loss function
satisfies Assumption 3.2. For the two-layer network defined in Equation (5), if we run
gradient descent with a small stepsize α, then for any ǫ > 0, ifm = Ω
(
B4
ǫ2
)
, we have
min
k=1,··· ,T
LA(Wk)− L∗(W∗) ≤ ǫ, (22)
where W∗ = min
W∈Rˆ(W0,B) L∗(W) and T = Ω(
√
m
α
).
Proof. Now each step we take an updateWk+1 = Wk−α∇WLA(Wk). We can compute
an upper bound on the Lipschitz of∇Wf :
‖∇Wf(W)−∇Wf(W′)‖F ≤ maxr |ar|√
m
‖σ′(Wx))− σ′(W′x)‖2‖x‖2 = O
(‖W −W′‖F√
m
)
,
which implies that f(W) isO
(
1√
m
)
-weakly convex, i.e. adding a termO
(
1√
m
‖W −W′‖2F
)
would make it convex. DenoteR = {W|‖W−W0‖F ≤ 3B}. Since LA(W) = ℓ(f(W))
and ℓ is convex and has bounded derivative, we know that forW,W′ ∈ R,
LA(W′)− LA(W)
≥ℓ′(f(W))(f(W′)− f(W))
≥ℓ′(f(W))(∇Wf(W)(W′ −W))− |ℓ′(f(W))| · O( 1√
m
) ‖W −W′‖2F
=∇WLA(W)− O( 1√
m
) ‖W −W′‖2F
which means LA(W) is also O
(
1√
m
)
-weakly convex.
Denote dk = ‖Wk−W∗‖F . There are two situations during the optimization process:
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Case 1. Wk ∈ R holds for all k = 1, · · · , T . We have
d2k+1 = ‖Wk+1 −W∗‖2F
= ‖Wk −W∗‖2F + 2(Wk+1 −Wk) · (Wk −W∗) + ‖Wk+1 −Wk‖2F
= d2k + 2α∇WLA(Wk) · (W∗ −Wk) + α2‖∇WLA‖2F
≤ d2k + 2α
∑
i
[ℓ(W∗,A(wk,xi))− ℓ(Wk,A(Wk,xi)) +O( 1√
m
)‖W∗ −Wk‖2F ] +Mα2
≤ d2k + 2α(L∗(W∗)− LA(Wk)) +O(
1√
m
)‖W∗ −Wk‖2F ) +Mα2
≤ (1 +O( α√
m
))d2k − 2αDk + α2M,
where the first inequality is based on the above convexity result, andDk = mini=1,··· ,k(LA(Wi)−
L∗(W∗)). Also, by Lemma G.2 in [19] with probability 0.99 ‖W0‖2 = O(1) and then
‖W‖2 = O(1) for W ∈ R, so
M = max
W∈R
‖∇WLA‖2 = max
W∈R
‖(Wx) ◦ I(Wx ≥ 0)‖22 ≤ max
W∈R
‖Wx‖22 = O(1).
Let Tk = (1 +O(
α√
m
))k which is a geometric series, we have
d2k+1
Tk
≤ d
2
k
Tk−1
− 2αDk
Tk
+
O(α2)
Tk
≤ · · · ≤
≤ d21 − 2α
k∑
i=1
Di
Ti
+O(α2)
k∑
i=1
1
Ti
≤ d21 −DkO(
√
m)(
1
T1
− 1
Tk+1
) +O(α
√
m)(
1
T1
− 1
Tk+1
),
which gives
Dk ≤ O(α) +
d21 − d
2
k+1
Tk
O(
√
m)( 1
T1
− 1
Tk+1
)
.
Choosing a small α and and T = 1/O(α/
√
m), we will have T1 ≈ 1, TK ≈ e. So when α
is small enough, we have DK = O(
B2√
m
).
Case 2. If Wk /∈ R happens, say first at step k + 1, since we have Tk+1 = O(1),
which makes d21 − d
2
k+1
Tk
≤ B2 − 4B2 ≤ 0. So we have Dk ≤ O(α). Then for a small α,
Dk = O(
B2√
m
) still holds.
So in any case the result is correct, thus we have proved the convergence without the
need of projection.
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D Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. We prove this theorem by an explicit construction of
[
n
2
]× d data points that F is
guaranteed to be able to shatter. Consider the following data points
xi,j = ci + ǫej for i ∈ {1, · · · ,
[n
2
]
}, j ∈ [d],
where ci = (5iδ, 0, · · · , 0)⊤ ∈ Rd, ǫ is a small constant, and ej = (0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0) ∈ Rd
is the j-th unit vector. For any labeling yi,j ∈ {1,−1}, we let Pi = {j : yi,j = 1},
Ni = {j : yi,j = −1}, and let #Pi = ki. The idea is that for every cluster of points
{xi,j}nj=1, we use 2 disjoint balls with radius δ to separate the positive and negative data
points. In fact, for every such cluster, the hyperplane
Mi = {x : (yi,1, · · · , yi,d) · x = 0},
clearly separates the points into {xi,j : j ∈ Pi} and {xi,j : j ∈ Ni}. Then we can see easily
that there exists a constant γki > 0 such that for any r > γkiǫ, there exist two Euclidean
balls Br(x′i,1),Br(x′i,2) in Rd with radius r, such that they contain the set {xi,j : j ∈ Pi}
and {xi,j : j ∈ Ni} respectively, and that Br(x′i,1) and Br(x′i,2) are also separated byMi.
Therefore, as long as we take
ǫ < δmax
(
1
γ1
, · · · , 1
γd
, 1
)
,
we can always put r = δ. In the case that Pi or Ni is empty, we can simply put one
ball centered at ci and the other anywhere far away. Such balls are disjoint since ǫ ≤ δ,∥∥x′i,l − ci∥∥2 ≤ 2δ for l = 1, 2, and ‖ci − ci′‖ ≥ 5δ for i 6= i′. In this way, we can use the
fact that there exists a function f ∈ F such that for any i ∈ {1, · · · , [n
2
]}, f(x) = 1 for
x ∈ Bδ(xi,1) and f(x) = −1 for x ∈ Bδ(xi,2). In this way, f(xi,j) = yi,j holds for all i, j.
Since the labels yi,j can be picked at will, by the definition of the VC-dimension, we know
that the VC-dimension of F is always at least [n
2
]× d.
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